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The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), 
also known as the Tokyo War Crimes Trials or Tribunal, has many layers 
that highlight the ambiguities and complexities of  international law and 
prosecution of  war criminals. The Tribunal took place in Allied occupied 
Japan post-World War II and dealt with Japanese Class A war criminals.1 
It convened on April 29, 1946, and adjourned on November 12, 1948. 
Upon the request of  the Japanese in early 1946, General Douglas MacAr-
thur ordered Americans to be recruited as defense lawyers for the Trials 
to ensure that the defendants had adequate and fair representation. This 
was due to the fact that the international trial procedures were based on 
Anglo-American judicial practices.2 These American lawyers defended the 
same people accused of  masterminding vicious atrocities during the war. 
Primary sources such as oral histories, essays, legal documents, and personal 
letters provide a glimpse into the mindset of  the American defense team. 
Georgetown University Law Library’s Special Collections houses an exten-
sive collection of  letters that John Brannon, one of  the American lawyers, 
wrote to his brother. These letters illustrate Brannon’s thoughts and beliefs 
on the Tribunal in Japan and were especially useful in analyzing the shifts in 
1 Japanese Class A war criminals were those accused of  planning and starting 
war. Class B and C war criminals were tried in their own trials separate from 
the IMTFE. These classes covered conventional war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Class B and C war criminals included high-ranking officers and military 
personnel. Class A war criminals included Japan’s top leaders. 
2 Carrington Williams, “The Tokyo War Crimes Trials Before the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East,” in International Humanitarian Law: Origins, 
Challenges, Prospects, ed. John Carey, William V. Dunlap, R. John Pritchard (Ardsley, 
NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2003), 113. “The Japanese requested the 
American lawyers because this was basically an Anglo-American trial with 
procedures foreign to them.”
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Brannon’s approach to his role. They allowed me to follow the journey of  
an American defense lawyer and gain access to Brannon’s inner thoughts 
and changing mentality over the course of  his time working for the defense.
Although the Americans and the Japanese were enemies during 
World War II, a change in the mindset of  the defense team enabled them to 
defend those accused of  committing such crimes as the bombing of  Pearl 
Harbor, the massacres in Nanking and Manila, and the mistreatment of  
Allied prisoners of  war (POWs) and civilian internees. Two questions arise: 
why did the U.S. feel the need to put American lawyers on the defense team 
at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, and how did Americans come to Japan’s 
defense following a war during which their clients were seen as the ene-
my? The desire to spread American democracy and values to Japan in the 
aftermath of  World War II was one of  the driving forces behind the Allied 
occupation of  Japan. This desire prompted Americans to try and prove 
the merit of  the American system to non-democratic nations through, for 
instance, the implementation of  the Anglo-American judicial system. Ap-
proaching the Tribunal with this mentality led Americans to work passion-
ately and diligently for the defense team, allowing them to view the defen-
dants no longer as the “enemy” but instead as the “client,” and in many 
cases as genuine friends worthy of  justice.
The battle between the Axis and Allied powers during World War 
II caused an outpouring of  nationalistic propaganda and a surge in nation-
alism on both sides. The Allied victory paved the way for Allied nations like 
the United States to promote the superiority of  democratic governments 
over totalitarian or fascist, militaristic governments to establish and ensure 
future peace in the aftermath of  an international war. By the end of  the 
war, the U.S. military, led by American General Douglas MacArthur as the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) or General Headquar-
ters (GHQ), had begun occupying Japan. As a part of  the occupation ef-
fort, the United States and other Allied powers took measures to prosecute 
German and Japanese war criminals. In addition to Class A war criminals, 
the U.S. also tried Class B and C war criminals during the Yokohama War 
Crimes Trials.3 Prior to the Tokyo Tribunal, MacArthur set up military tri-
bunals in Manila to prosecute General Homma Masaharuand and General 
Yamashita Tomoyuki, his combatants in the Philippines; both generals were 
executed.4  Afterward, MacArthur’s superiors in Washington advised him to 
create an international tribunal for Class A criminals to avoid the perception 
that the U.S. alone was using justice as a means to seek revenge. The charter 
for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was issued on Jan-
uary 19, 1946, and was modeled after the Nuremberg Charter. The trials in 
3 The United States primarily handled the Class B and C war trials in Yokohama, 
but many of  the Allies held their own Class B and C trials at various points from 
1946 to 1949. 
4 In this paper, all Japanese names from those in Asia will follow the traditional 
Japanese name order, which is the surname first followed by the given name. 
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Tokyo followed similar procedures to those in Germany. Initially, 28 Class 
A war criminals were selected for trial.5 When the Tribunal opened, judges 
were only from Allied nations. Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the Unit-
ed States, and the Soviet Union decided the fate of  the defendants.6 The 
Tribunal was a tool for the Allied nations to further promote democracy in 
an attempt to create a new westernized ally in Japan.  
The United States used the Occupation not only for convicting war 
criminals, but also in the hopes of  demilitarizing and democratizing Japan. 
Much of  the Occupation concentrated on establishing more democratic 
foundations in Japan stemming from American constitutional principles. 
Initially, the Occupation was essentially a United States operation in its 
execution. It was not until early 1946 that other Allied nations were offi-
cially represented in the Occupation effort through the creation of  the Far 
Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan.7 The Department 
of  the Army recruited American civilian personnel to work with the offices 
of  SCAP, which contained special staff  sections that centered on aspects 
of  labor, health, government/political, and education reform, as well as 
sections that handled censorship and intelligence. For example, there was 
a government section, which prepared a model draft constitution for a post-
war Japan. It contained key democratic values and phrases such as “we the 
people” and “life, liberty, and the pursuit of  happiness” that are present in 
the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of  Independence. The Japanese 
Constitution went into effect on May 3, 1947, and remains Japan’s constitu-
tion to this day. It also included provisions for suffrage, direct elections, and 
freedoms of  speech, religion, and the press. The United States inserted its 
own ideologies into the development of  Japan’s postwar society. 
In a similar fashion, the Tribunal was implemented in part to 
determine international precedent for war crimes prosecution based on 
Anglo-American judicial values in particular. SCAP’s legal section concen-
trated on Japan’s alleged war criminals for the IMTFE and was an instru-
ment to help further democratize Japan. John Dower argues in his 1999 
5 Eiji Taekemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of  Japan and its Legacy (New 
York, NY: Continuum, 2002), 243-4. Also, Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial: The Pursuit in the Wake of  World War II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Asia Center, 2008), 25, 43-77. The choice of  whom to put on trial was quite 
controversial. A series of  interrogations took place to make the determination. 
The Allied Powers were unsure if  they should charge Emperor Hirohito. SCAP 
ultimately decided not to try him. 
6 Initially, the Tribunal had nine representative judges from the Allied nations. Later, 
justices representing India and Philippines joined the court.  
7 General Staff  of  Douglas MacArthur, ed., Reports of  General MacArthur: MacArthur 
in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase: Volume 1 Supplement (Facsimile Reprint, 1994), 
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20
V1%20Sup/Index.htm#cont. 
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book, Embracing Defeat, that, “to American reformers, much of  the almost 
sensual excitement involved in promoting their democratic revolution from 
above derived from the feeling that this involved denaturing an Oriental 
adversary and turning it into at least an approximation of  an acceptable, 
healthy, westernized nation.”8 This sentiment permeated the Occupation 
and encouraged a sense of  pride in spreading democratic principles. In his 
opening statement, the prosecution’s Chief  Counsel, Joseph B. Keenan, a 
Harvard-trained lawyer, stated, “They [the Japanese war criminals] declared 
war on civilization. They made the rules and defined the issues. They were 
determined to destroy democracy and its essential basis – freedom and 
respect of  human personality.”9 Keenan maintained that the defendants had 
engaged in aggressive warfare, arguing the Japanese had aimed to disrupt 
international objectives toward peace. In his controversial yet highly influ-
ential work on the Trials, Victor’s Justice, Richard Minear argues, “The trial 
was a kind of  morality play, a reaffirmation of  a world view that had been 
one factor in the making of  World War II.”10 This supports the idea of  the 
Tribunal as a means for the U.S. in particular to prosecute war criminals as 
an extension of  its wish to promote democratic values on an international 
scale. 
Many of  the civilian workers within SCAP were aware of  the U.S. 
goal to democratize Japan and gained a unique perspective by living in Japan 
while being a part of  the Occupation. The Gordon W. Prange Collection at 
the University of  Maryland, College Park, contains a collection of  over 100 
oral histories that provide recollections from various American players of  
the Occupation. Several of  these oral histories give further insight into the 
defense mindset as well as the perception of  the U.S.’s role in Japan from 
those outside the defense section. For example, Luella Moffett, secretary 
for the Legal and Government Section of  SCAP, was asked what America’s 
goal was with occupying Japan. She replied, “Well, she [America] was trying 
to, I should say, turn Japan into a friend rather than an ex-enemy.”11 Donald 
Ritchie, film critic for the Pacific Stars and Stripes newspaper, said, “Yes, I 
remember democracy was a great thing because that was on all Japanese 
tongues at that point.”12 Others discussed their view of  the Japanese during 
8 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of  World War II (New York, 
NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999), 80.
9 University of  Virginia (UVA) School of  Law, “Prosecution Opening Statement,” 
The Tokyo War Crimes Trials: Digital Collection, http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/
collections/morgan/3/4/prosecution-opening-statement (2016).
10 Richard H. Minear, Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), 179. 
11 Luella Moffett Oral History, Marlene J. Mayo Oral Histories, Gordon W. Prange 
Collection, University of  Maryland Libraries, Virginia Beach, Virginia, September 
11, 1979, 20. Hereafter, Name, Mayo Oral Histories, location of  interview, date of  
interview, page. 
12 Donald Ritchie, Mayo Oral Histories, Tokyo, May 18, 1981, 9. 
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the War and the Tribunal. Herbert Greer, a Colonel judge advocate and 
member of  the 24th Division, commented, “Well, I had no personal feeling 
about it [the Tribunal]. I thought it was proper. I don’t know how else you 
would feel about a thing like that. They [the Japanese] were cruel. I’d known 
many who’d been and had many friends who’d been prisoners [of  the Japa-
nese], and of  course I didn’t take kindly to the treatment they’d received.”13 
Many of  the American occupiers were aware that a goal of  the Occupation 
was to somehow reorient Japan based on the ideals of  the U.S. version of  
democracy. This rested on the belief  that democratic values fostered a more 
just and functional way of  governing and that the Occupation would turn 
Japan into a fully democratic nation and future ally. 
The American defense team arrived in Japan with hopes of  show-
casing the superiority of  the Anglo-American way in line with the Occupa-
tion’s aims. They felt justified because they understood the Trials as aiding 
in the American mission of  promoting democracy through employing 
American legal ideals. In the case of  Elaine Fischel, the secretary for two 
of  the lawyers, John Brannon and William Logan, she initially wished to 
work for the prosecution team and was disappointed to be placed with the 
defense.14 However, that feeling changed as she spent more time working 
on the defense cases and being around the defendants as well as exploring 
Japan and socializing with the Japanese. In her 2008 memoir, she included 
personal photographs and letters from the time she was on the defense 
team. She says, reflecting on her time in Japan working as an Army civilian, 
“There was no way to get around the fact that for the past two and a half  
years, I helped defend ‘the enemy.’”15 Fischel’s memoir offers some answers 
as she recounts her time assisting with the cases for Kido Kōichi and mem-
bers of  the Japanese Navy under Logan and Brannon.16 In her introduc-
tion, she states, “Like so many other Americans [during the War], I judged 
13 Herbert Greer, Mayo Oral Histories, Norfolk, Virginia, September 12, 1979, 7-8.
14 She was interested in attending law school prior to going to Japan. When she 
learned of  an opening for a secretarial position at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, she 
believed it would be good preparation for the legal profession and took the job.
15 Elaine B. Fischel, Defending the Enemy: Justice for the WWII War Criminals 
(Minneapolis, MN: Bascom Hills Books, 2009), 292. Hereafter, Fischel, page. 
16 Kido Kōichi was the Lord Keeper of  the Privy Seal and the closest advisor 
to Emperor Hirohito during the War. He offered his 5,000-page diary to 
the prosecution, thinking it would help his defense. He was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. He served six years before being released in 1953. The members 
of  the Japanese Navy included: Nagano Osami, admiral, former Navy minister, 
and chief  of  General Naval Staff. He was known for being the leader of  the Pearl 
Harbor attack. He passed away during the Tribunal in 1947; Shimada Shigetarō, 
admiral and Navy minister. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, but was 
released on parole in 1955; Oka Takasumi, admiral and chief  of  the General 
and Military Affairs Bureau of  the Navy Ministry. He was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, but granted provisional release in 1954. 
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Japanese people by the horrific hallmark event that took place at Pearl 
Harbor… to me, the Japanese were evil, subhuman people.”17 However, she 
ends her introduction, saying, “When I finally came home [from Japan], I 
had a completely different perspective of  these people and their culture.”18 
She began to challenge her pre-established, engrained beliefs. 
The American defense team believed they were upholding Amer-
ican democratic values by promoting Anglo-American common law 
standards in the courtroom. Approaching the Tribunal in this way led the 
American lawyers to wholeheartedly defend people accused of  committing 
malicious acts toward their nation during the war and causing the deaths of  
their neighbors and loved ones. Carrington Williams, the American defense 
lawyer for Hoshino Naoki, shared his reaction after being offered to join 
the defense.19 He said, “The prospect of  defending the Japanese enemy 
did not attract me; I was a strong believer in our wartime crusade as I saw 
it, fighting aggression and dictatorship. This almost seemed like changing 
sides. However […] Japan was an exciting place to be as the Allied Occu-
pation tried to reform it from being a military terror into a democracy.”20 
Williams justified his job as a way to assist the American effort postwar. 
Upon hearing that they would be joining the defense team, many 
of  the other lawyers reacted similarly to Williams. On December 19, 1947, 
Brannon wrote to his brother, nicknamed Sonny, “I want to contribute 
to the establishment of  future international law predicated on American 
concepts of  justice.”21 Almost a year before, however, he had written, “I 
am an American first and a lawyer second.”22 Along the same vein, George 
Furness said, “Some people… in America used to come and say when 
I went back there during the trial, ‘I assume you’re doing as bad a job as 
you can.’ I’d say, ‘Of  course not. I’m a lawyer and I’m very glad to defend 
them.’”23 And Owen Cunningham, defense lawyer for the ambassador to 
Germany, Ōshima Hiroshi, said, “My role was to see that justice as under-
stood in Anglo-Saxon countries was fairly and impartially administered.”24  
17 Fischel, xiii.
18 Ibid., xv.
19 Hoshino Naoki was a politician who was involved in the drug trafficking in 
Manchuria. He was sentenced to life imprisonment but released from prison in 
1958. 
20 Williams, The Tokyo War Crimes Trials, 111. 
21 Brannon, December 19, 1947.
22 Brannon, February 26, 1947. 
23 George Furness Part 2, Mayo Oral Histories, Tokyo, May 18, 1981, 13.
24 Ōshima Hiroshi was an Army officer as well as ambassador to Germany from 
1938-39. He was sentenced to life in prison, but was paroled in 1955 and granted 
clemency three years later. 
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25 The lawyers understood it as their duty as American attorneys to view the 
defendants solely as clients without influence from the war and home front 
attitudes. They viewed the Tribunal as a way to represent the functionality 
of  their judicial process, categorizing the defendants purely as clients seek-
ing rightful justice.
American lawyers worked closely with the Japanese lawyers, be-
coming acquainted with various Japanese mentalities, nuances in language, 
and customs.26 The Tribunal was set up to follow an Anglo-American adver-
sarial system, foreign to many of  the Japanese.27 Americans were added to 
the defense team to work with the Japanese lawyers and ensure a fair trial.28 
However, the defense team contained no other Allied representatives beside 
Americans. George Furness, defense lawyer for Shigemitsu Mamoru, the 
defendant who received the lightest sentence of  seven years in prison, said 
that many of  the Japanese defense lawyers were diplomats and not aware 
of  the workings of  Anglo-American law.29 Other Japanese lawyers felt 
frustrated with the language barrier and the trial setup. In one of  his letters, 
John Brannon described his shock in discovering that the Japanese lawyers 
were not fully versed in Anglo-American principles and procedures of  law. 
He explained,, “They beg to learn and plead for explanations.”30 Some of  
the Japanese attorneys were quite well-versed in these judicial practices, but 
even they expressed frustrations about the Tribunal’s setup. Chief  Defense 
Counsel, Takayanagi Kenzō, a University of  Tokyo professor who had 
studied law at Harvard, was considered Japan’s leading authority on An-
glo-American law.31 In one of  his legal arguments, he noted that Japanese 
defense lawyers could not correctly interpret the concept of  “conspiracy,” 
one of  the charges, within the Anglo-American legal context because it was 
25 Owen Cunningham, “The Major Evils of  the Tokyo Trials” (Address to be 
delivered, Seattle, Washington, September 7, 1948), Gordon W. Prange Collection, 
University of  Maryland Libraries, 1. 
26 Unfortunately, there is a gap in Western scholarship on the Japanese defense 
lawyers. Therefore, information has been drawn from primary source material and 
the pieces of  information available in scholarship that do mention the Japanese 
lawyers.  
27 Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 125. “…most of  them [the Japanese defense 
lawyers] had little training in the adversarial system and did not fully understand 
how to carry cross-examinations effectively.”
28 Fischel, 25. “To ensure a fair trial, guidance from the Allied nations was 
essential.”
29 Shigemitsu Mamoru was a former diplomat and foreign minister. He received the 
lightest sentence of  seven years in prison. He was paroled in 1950 and went on to 
become Deputy Prime Minister of  Japan.
30 Georgetown Law Library, “John G. Brannon Papers”, August 8, 1948. Hereafter, 
Brannon, date. The collection contains letters from John to Sonny from November 
1946 through July 1950. One letter dates earlier to December 1, 1945. 
31 Taekemae, Inside GHQ, 244. 
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beyond their legal education.32 The interaction of  American and Japanese 
defense lawyers fostered a diffusion of  knowledge and culture. 
American defense lawyers were exposed to Japanese customs and 
traditions through these interactions, alerting them to Japanese approach-
es to the world that differed from those common to the U.S. The defense 
even argued that the prosecuting Allied nations perhaps misunderstood the 
Japanese and their motivations during the War when determining the indict-
ments. For example, in one of  the Defense Opening Statements, the team 
claimed that the prosecution had misunderstood the Japanese phrase hakko 
ichiu. The phrase, included in the preamble of  the Tripartite Pact of  1940, 
means conceptually that the Japanese were seeking a universal brotherhood, 
yet it was more literally translated to, “Eight corners of  the world under one 
roof.” The prosecution focused on the translated meaning rather than the 
conceptual one, interpreting the phrase as proof  that Japan consciously in-
tended to conquer the world in cooperation with Germany and Italy.33 The 
defense responded that the prosecution based their claims on false evidence 
due to ignorance of  the Japanese and their language. Working directly with 
Japanese defense lawyers offered the American attorneys a way to better 
understand the Japanese mentality and worldview, helping them to develop 
a sincere defense. 
The defense team was able to detach itself  from the anti-Japanese 
propaganda and bias, allowing them to devote their time toward providing 
the best possible defense. They became engrossed in their work, believing 
in their clients’ innocence and questioning the fairness of  the Tribunal. 
Minear heavily criticized the Tribunal, calling it a “showpiece” “designed 
not only to punish wrongdoers but also to justify the right side, our [the 
U.S.’s] side.”34 35 Dower agrees, arguing that, “Class A trials were funda-
mentally an exercise in revenge.”36 Yet, some contemporary scholars have 
contended against this consensus. Yuma Totani claims that the Tribunal 
correctly followed the international law precedent set forth by The Hague 
Conventions and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of  1928, which denounced 
aggressive warfare as a sufficient instrument of  national policy. She also 
maintains that the Tribunal was modeled after the Nuremberg Trial, and 
the indictments in the IMTFE were considered international crimes at 
32 UVA School of  Law, “Conspiracy Article by Kenzo Takayanagi,” The Tokyo War 
Crimes Trials: Digital Collection, http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/carrington-
williams/2/3/conspiracy-article-kenzo-takayanagi (2016).
33 Kobori Keiichiro, The Tokyo Trials: The Unheard Defense: English Edition (Rockport, 
ME: 
New England History Press, 2003), 57.
34 Richard H. Minear, Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), 6. 
35 Minear, Victor’s Justice, 13.
36 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 252.
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Nuremberg.37 Similarly, historian Tim Maga disputes that despite its attach-
ments to popular labels such as “racism” and “vengeance,” the Tribunal 
exercised proper legal practices and validly sought justice against acts of  
evil.38 Although existing scholarship continues to debate the legitimacy of  
the charges against the Japanese war criminals, the defense team adamantly 
argued that their clients were innocent and that the Tribunal was, from the 
start, working against the defendants. 
Many of  the defense lawyers began to see the Tribunal as inherent-
ly unjust, which accelerated the intensity of  their desire to defend their cli-
ents. This is exemplified in one of  Brannon’s letters from December 1947, 
in which he wrote, “It is my contention that until an impartial international 
judicial body is established to hear such matters as have engaged us here for 
two years, there will be no hope for the writing of  sane and just internation-
al law whose objective is to prevent wars – not to avenge the wounds of  
the conquerors.”39 One month prior, he wrote, “…that I gave my all for the 
preservation of  international justice. Honestly, I think we [the defense team] 
have performed a service to the whole world in proving how ridiculous it is 
to attempt to convict a group of  men on purely political charges.”40 A year 
later, Brannon told Sonny, “Never let it be said that this trial does not have 
many of  the aspects of  American justice. But at the same time it must be 
recognized that it is basically non American, [displacing] so many of  our 
most cherished principles of  justice.”41 Brannon clearly articulated his grow-
ing discontent with the Trials. His letters show the shift in his perspective 
from someone supporting the American cause to someone who questioned 
it. 
Early in his time in Japan, Brannon struggled with balancing 
allegiance to his country and maintaining impartiality as a lawyer.42 A few 
months after arriving in Japan, Brannon expressed to Sonny his inner con-
flict. “To do this job I would have to blast the American Navy and its plan-
ning for war as well as the state department. Shall I? Is it worth it? Would it 
do more harm than good? Shall I fake a sincere defense and protect the U.S. 
37 Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 78-87. 
38 Tim Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials (Lexington, KY: The 
University Press of  Kentucky, 2001), ix-xiv.  
39 Brannon, December 19, 1947. 
40 Brannon, November 14, 1947. 
41 Brannon, September 16, 1948.
42 Brannon wrote to Sonny on December 19, 1947: “The fallacy of  your thinking in 
regard to these alleged war criminals here is a perfect example [of] narrow minded 
American and elsewhere thinking. And by this I do not criticize you personally. 
‘There is Pearl Harbor to avenge,’ you write… I’m afraid the characterization you 
put on it is generally accepted by the allied countries and their people. And you say, 
‘just remember if  we lost the war I rather imagine, etc.’ Of  course that is true. If  
we had lost the war, these Japs wouldn’t even give us a trial. They would have raped 
America. But that isn’t the reason I am here…” 
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or shall I go all out?” Brannon wondered.43 Toward the end of  the Tribunal, 
Brannon also offered Sonny his thoughts on American hypocrisy in regards 
to the War Crimes Trials and the treatment of  the defendants. When writing 
of  how the indicted war criminals remained locked up in Sugamo Prison for 
three years during trial, Brannon asked Sonny, “Is this American justice or 
just plain hypocrisy?” Over the course of  his two years in Japan, Brannon’s 
correspondence maps a drastic change in mindset. He began questioning 
the American way because of  his ability to view his clients as purely clients. 
They were no longer enemies, no longer criminals. They were legally inno-
cent in the eyes of  Brannon, and soon Brannon began to view the United 
States as more of  the wrongdoer.44 
Americans on the defense team accumulated suspicions concern-
ing the Tribunal’s intentions. The notion that the Allies were prosecut-
ing Japanese leaders for their part in wartime atrocities, even though the 
Allies themselves had committed comparable acts, namely the U.S. atomic 
bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, led American lawyers to switch 
their focus away from promoting the superiority of  the American judicial 
way toward protecting the defendants.45 Minear called this hypocrisy of  
the trial, “victor’s justice,” of  which the American defense team became 
acutely aware.46 Only those nations that won the war were represented on 
the court and they were to decide the fate of  their former war enemies. 
However, many of  the indictments against the war criminals were crimes of  
which the Allies, too, were guilty. Brannon and the other lawyers exploited 
this unfairness as a part of  their defense, increasingly becoming frustrated 
that their clients were on trial to be potentially executed or imprisoned for 
life for violating fundamentally ex post facto laws. George Furness criticized 
that it was “not a fair trial at all” since the Japanese were to be judged by 
43 Brannon, December 14, 1946. 
44 In an undated letter to Sonny housed in the Harry S. Truman Library Archives, 
Brannon wrote, “For 
some time, I have been wanting to write you concerning the legal aspects… so that 
you might better understand the many difficulties entailed in producing a defense 
that is plausible, if  not adequate… In the first place, we, as an American counsel, 
serving our government and particularly the War Department, must exercise some 
discretion… Believe me, it is apparent among many of  the America defense lawyers 
that there has been a gradual change during the past six months from the idea that 
Japan was responsible for this war to a field of  thought where it is actually believed 
that America and Great Britain forced the issue and produced the result.”
45 Defense arguments that mentioned the atomic bombings were not considered in 
the Trials. 
46 Minear, Victor’s Justice, 77. “…the members of  this tribunal being representatives 
of  the nations which defeated Japan and which are the accusers in this action, a 
legal, fair, and impartial trials is denied to these accused by arraignment before this 
trial.”
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the victor nations.47 Owen Cunningham condemned the U.S. for the Trial’s 
creation and structure, saying, “The whole proceeding was contrary to 
American ideals and principles of  justice.”48 Williams concurred, saying, “… 
it was then my opinion, shared by other American defense counsel, that de-
spite our horror at Japanese atrocities, it was basically a political trial. It still 
is.”49 Ben Bruce Blakeney, defense lawyer for Tōgō Shigenori, also strongly 
maintained that the trial was unfair and hypocritical, especially in regards to 
the counts of  aggressive war against the Soviet Union, which broke its five-
year non-aggression pact with Japan, attacking during the final days of  the 
war. 50 Appealing the verdicts to MacArthur, Blakeney wrote, “The verdict 
was not fair; not based on the evidence.”51 The defense also upheld that the 
defendants warned the U.S. of  plans to attack Pearl Harbor but the message 
was not sent in time. Many of  these lawyers, who initially justified being on 
the defense team as a way to promote American values, were now criticizing 
their country for not providing an adequate trial for their clients.52 
The defense attorneys became convinced of  the innocence of  
their clients, which is evident in their passionate presence in court. They 
began to critique various components of  the judicial standards upon which 
the IMTFE was grounded. The Defense General Opening Statement A, 
presented by Japanese counsel Kiyose Ichiro on February 24, 1947, touched 
on the topic of  conspiracy. It stated: “… it is not proper to apply a partic-
ular legal theory which had developed in a certain country… as if  it were 
a general principle of  law of  universal application. The idea of  conspiracy 
is unique in the Anglo-American legal system…”53 The statement contin-
ued to explain that the idea of  conspiracy, even in Anglo-American legal 
systems, is too abstract to determine criminality. The defense argued that by 
legal definition, for conspiracy as a crime to have occurred, there needed to 
be a certain date and place to constitute a plotting, yet the prosecution just 
gave the range from January 1928 to September 2, 1945. Kiyose’s opening 
statement showcased the defense team’s vehement belief  that many of  the 
charges, like the charge of  conspiracy, had little merit. Another example is 
from Count 37, which accounts for crimes listed as “murder.” The counsel 
“contend[ed] that the loss of  lives due to the act of  war does not constitute 
47 George Furness Part 1, Mayo Oral Histories, Tokyo, May 14, 1981, 14.
48 Cunningham, “The Major Evils,” 2. 
49 Williams, The Tokyo War Crimes Trials, 108.
50 Tōgō Shigenori was a career diplomat and former ambassador to Germany and 
Moscow, as well as the former Minister of  Foreign Affairs for Japan. In 1941, he 
became Foreign Minister under Prime Minister Tōjō. He was sentenced to 20 years 
in prison, but passed away in 1950, while in prison. 
51 Fischel, xxvi.
52 Ibid., 197. Fischel remembers Brannon saying, “We won this war on the 
battlefield; and we’re not going to lose it in the courtroom,” 197. 
53 Kobori, The Unheard Defense, 61.
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murder. This, we believe, is an accepted theory of  international law…”54 
Furthermore, the defense expanded on the counts regarding the mistreat-
ment of  POWs, stating that the alleged war criminals at IMTFE were 
unaware of  the treatment, as this had not been their domain and had been 
beyond their scope of  authority to change. They also touched on the notion 
that some of  the indictments were based on ex post facto law. The defense 
counsel argued that Crimes Against Peace and Crimes Against Humanity 
were not established laws prior to when the accused supposedly committed 
them; therefore, these charges should be inadmissible.55 The Trial proceed-
ings span over 20,000 pages, showing that the defense team had numerous 
arguments to contend the various counts and charges. Understanding some 
of  their main points helps to paint a clearer picture as to why the defense 
counsel came to accept the Japanese alleged war criminals as innocent of  
the charges against them.
The American lawyers no longer viewed their clients as the adver-
sary, and in many cases, were able to develop genuine friendships with their 
Japanese clients. The available primary source accounts exhibit that being 
in Japan and working for the defense changed the lawyers’ mindset from 
the wartime loathing of  the Japanese to curiosity, respect, and an authentic 
liking. Elaine Fischel’s various letters home showcase her changing outlook 
and increased sympathy for the Japanese. For instance, she wrote, “I came 
over here after seeing the U.S. cartoons expecting to see 26 monkeys sitting 
in court and being on trial, and yet there are 26 men up there each with 
individual personalities and faces...”56 While in Japan, she even developed a 
friendship with Prince Takamatsu, one of  the Emperor’s brothers. She also 
occasionally stayed with Kido’s family during the Tribunal and continually 
referred to General Tōjō Hideki, who was regarded as the number one 
war criminal, as “nice.”57 She recalled that, “It desperately mattered to me 
that they [the naval defendants] not be hanged,” and wrote, “Each of  the 
American defense attorneys became so attached to his particular clients; the 
thought of  seeing them hanged was unbearable.”58 59 In her memoir’s intro-
duction, she also wrote, “I was proud and happy to be associated with the 
defense, despite the bitterness many of  my countrymen felt about provid-
ing assistance to people who they considered barbaric murderers.”60
Fischel was not the only American on the defense team to devel-
op affections toward the Japanese defendants. She and Brannon were the 
54 Ibid., 72.
55 Ibid., 112.
56 Fischel, 136. Initially, twenty-eight men were indicted. However, only twenty-
five were charged. Two died during the Tribunal and one was declared insane and 
removed from trial.
57 Ibid., 121.
58 Ibid., 240. 
59 Ibid., 162.
60 Ibid., 20.
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lone non-Japanese at the memorial service of  Admiral Nagano, one of  
Brannon’s clients.61 She said of  Brannon, “[He] was caught in the middle 
of  loyalty to his homeland and loyalty to his client’s defense.”62 During his 
time in Japan, Brannon developed a curiosity and subsequent love for the 
country, its people, and its culture. He wrote to Sonny about his excite-
ment after the Tokyo Bar Association contacted him to become a member. 
Brannon went on to describe his desire to practice law in both Japan and 
the United States.63 In select letters, he also explained his growing rela-
tionship with Nagano’s family, often dining at Nagano’s sister’s house and 
comforting Nagano’s brother-in-law after Nagano’s passing.64 65 In a similar 
respect, George Furness had close ties to his client’s family, with Shigemitsu 
allowing Furness to stay at his house on the weekends, since Shigemitsu was 
away in Sugamo.66 Furness became so enchanted by Japan that he decided 
to remain after the Trials, opening up a law practice and marrying a Japa-
nese woman.67 Carrington Williams, in a 2003 essay, also shared that he sent 
a Christmas card to his defendant’s widow each year.68 Beverly Coleman, 
the chief  of  the defense section until June 1946, had Admiral Nomura, the 
Japanese ambassador to the U.S. during the attack on Pearl Harbor, over 
for dinner during his time in occupied Japan.69 When asked to explain how 
he could defend the same men who were labeled wartime enemies, Beverly 
Coleman responded that it was “like a boxer or team who shake hands after 
it is over.”70 The Americans began to see their clients as individuals, with 
families and personalities, feelings, and even valid justifications for their 
actions during the war. 
Examining the Tribunal and the journey of  these American lawyers 
opens the door to better understand the implications of  American ex-
ceptionalism and the role of  the U.S. in foreign relations, especially in the 
context of  war. War creates a gray area in terms of  right versus wrong, legal 
versus illegal. Furthermore, war introduces a broader issue in that nations 
begin to overlap and try to reach a consensus on overarching concepts. Yet, 
each nation has their own set of  ethical codes, government structure, and 
legal outlines. During war and postwar periods, the legal and ethical ideals 
61 Ibid., 167.
62 Ibid., 165.
63 Brannon, November 27, 1946. 
64 Brannon, December 14, 1946. 
65 Brannon, January 13, 1947. 
66 George Furness Part 2, Mayo Oral Histories, Tokyo, May 18, 1981, 2.
67 George Furness Part 2, Mayo Oral Histories, Tokyo, May 18, 1981, 15.
68 Williams, The Tokyo War Crimes Trials, 14.
69 Beverly Coleman, Mayo Oral Histories, Washington, D.C., March 25, 1980, 23. 
Coleman would leave the defense team early in the trial, along with a few other 
American lawyers, because he was unhappy with the way the defense was being 
organized.
70 Ibid., 38.
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of  each nation are often obscured in the inherent unethicalness of  war, 
making the idea of  prosecuting war criminals an extremely delicate and 
intricate process. The ambiguities of  wartime international law and ethics as 
well as the U.S.’s role in international relations remain a consistently relevant 
area of  interest in historical discourse. The story of  the American defense 
team at IMTFE adds a new layer to the narrative. 
From their passionate and vigorous work for the defense, it might 
seem that Americans on the defense team virtually forgot that their friends 
and family viewed the Japanese as vicious murderers, though this is untrue. 
Rather, they detached themselves from this propagandized mentality in 
order to provide their clients a fair trial in line with the values they felt dis-
tinguished the United States from other nations at the time. Americans on 
the defense team employed their way of  approaching law in order to uphold 
the American ideals they deemed precious, just, and superior. In doing so, 
they were able to view the defendants no longer as the enemy but purely as 
clients entitled to a fair trial. In their research, many of  the defense law-
yers truly did discover their clients to be innocent and victims of  an unfair 
“victor’s justice” trial, consequently fighting devotedly for a “not guilty” 
verdict. Toward the end of  the Tribunal, Brannon wrote to Sonny that, “It 
is us – Americans – that are the teachers. It us that profess a better way of  life, 
of  government… It is not only asinine, but simply insane to justify what we 
do now by pointing to the Japanese and saying, ‘you would have done much 
worse.’ ”71 The American defense team gained a sense of  loyalty toward the 
Japanese defendants, diverging from the sentiments of  many of  their coun-
trymen. They did so through applying Anglo-American judicial principles to 
their legal approach, originally to promote American values aligned with the 
country’s postwar wish to spread democracy, but in the end, leading them to 
see the Japanese war criminals as individuals who genuinely deserved justice. 
71 Brannon, August 8, 1948.
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